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Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime: 
Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as 
Alternative Arenas in Jordan
Pénélope Larzillière, Institut de recherche pour le développement, Paris, France
How does political commitment develop when actors are confronted with authoritarian processes? Under a liberal authoritarian regime, even the creation of demo-
cratic institutions may mean authoritarian stabilization (contradicting classical transition theories) rather than open an arena for political protest. However, alternative 
contentious arenas may appear, where resourceful organizations can be partially transformed into a basis for protest with challenging frames of reference. In the Jord-
anian case, the professional associations (in contravention of corporatism theory) and the Islamist social movement have thus gained oppositional capacity. However, 
apart from repression, their own economic and social roles, and their integration in the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambiva-
lence arises between challenging and integrated positions and when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role, rad-
icalization processes appear. Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas and their relational characteristics. These political arenas are also the places where 
alternative ideologies are produced. At that level, the Islamist movement has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power 
and position. The case thus supports an analytical separation between power position and ideology and confirms the need for less state-centred definition of ideology.
Authoritarian regimes attempt to control, repress, or even 
eradicate any political challenge. Repressive settings reduce 
the possibility for collective action and increase the risks of 
political commitment, but do not eliminate contentious 
politics. However stable the regime may appear, the dy-
namics of opposition are in play and lead to an ebb and flow 
of mobilization. So how does political commitment develop 
when actors are confronted with coercive processes? What 
arenas, dynamics, and repertoires of action are involved? Is 
it possible to identify processes of (de)radicalization in such 
contexts? A meso-level analysis of the Jordanian case ad-
dresses these questions and identifies arenas of mobilization 
and the different ways they interact with the state, from co-
optation to anti-system positioning (Albrecht 2009, 7).
In Jordan, alternative political arenas have been found to 
exist outside the very well controlled democratic in-
stitutions. They have gained oppositional capacity by com-
bining a widely recognized social utility (professional and 
charitable roles) with political activities. I will argue that in 
repressive settings (de)radicalization processes are linked to 
the emergence of such alternative political arenas. These 
arenas, in which political commitment is institutionalized, 
are framed by a constantly shifting relationship with the re-
gime, in that sense they can be analyzed as relational action 
fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Goldstone 2004). The 
notion of relational action field is useful in allowing a non-
static view of political commitment in authoritarian re-
gimes and a focus on its institutionalization in different 
arenas. However, rather than proposing a purely strategic 
analysis of these action fields, the study articulates it with 
an analysis of the frames of reference and ideologies used 
by incumbents and challengers and the legitimacy pro-
cesses at work. I argue that forms of cultural hegemony 
I would like to thank André Bank and the two 
anonymous referees for their insightful comments 
on and criticisms of a first version.
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may appear outside the state, confirming the need for less 
hegemonic and more differentiated analysis of the state, 
even in authoritarian contexts, as well as a less state-
centered definition of ideology (Hall 1982).
I will first analyze the repressive and authoritarian pro-
cesses at work in Jordan and assess their impact on political 
commitment. Democratic institutions have not truly 
opened up a protest political arena, but rather confirmed 
the shift toward a liberal authoritarian regime, contra-
dicting classical transition theories. I will therefore focus 
on the alternative arenas of mobilization represented by 
professional associations and the Islamist social movement, 
and how they have had deradicalizing effects. While pro-
fessional associations in Jordan do indeed open space for 
opposition (in contravention of corporatism theory), the 
Jordanian case also shows how integration may have rad-
icalizing effects when the possibility to change the political 
agenda is denied. Lastly, I will analyze how political dis-
affection is channeled by the regime through use of tribal 
networks, and identify the link between this depoliticiz-
ation and intertribal social violence, especially by youth.
1. Stability and Change in Authoritarian Control of Political Commitment
The Jordanian regime’s apparent stability is based on com-
plex, changing authoritarian processes operating in dif-
ferent arenas. This is the background to the many 
complexities of the political situation, where coercive 
measures coexist with legitimacy. In this context, demo-
cratic institutions may be created in a context of auth-
oritarian stabilization, and will consequently not be the 
place where political commitment and opposition occur.
Jordan has been a constitutional monarchy with an elected 
parliament since 1952, but politically it is a system of ex-
clusion where “participation is not a legal right but accord-
ed top-down” (translated from Droz-Vincent 2004, 208). 
The constitution itself gives almost absolute power to the 
king, who appoints the government and can dissolve par-
liament to rule by decree. Many coercive processes have 
been implemented, and the security apparatus is omnipre-
sent. The political scene is highly constrained, and defined 
by strict limits and “red lines” that the monarchy imposes. 
Two phases can be distinguished: before and after the li-
mited opening of 1989. Before 1989, all parties were for-
bidden and activists operated under semi-underground 
conditions, except for the Islamists, whose movement was 
the only authorized one.
In 1989, King Hussein announced a democratic opening 
with the intention of calming unrest and social demands, 
and in 1992 political parties were authorized. However, 
substantial limitations on the functioning of parties and 
democratic life have remained in force, reducing the real 
difference between the two periods. Scholars have many 
terms to describe this ambivalent change: “defensive de-
mocratization” (Robinson 1998; Bennani-Chraïbi and Fil-
lieule 2003, 44) or “paradoxical liberalization” 
(Droz-Vincent 2004, 197). This is an authoritarian power 
where democratic institutions and political opposition 
exist but there are severe limitations on the issues that can 
be raised. Although this was the time when democratic in-
stitutions came into existence, the process was in no way a 
democratic transition. The shaping of the political space 
stayed completely under the monarchy’s control. At that 
level, the Jordanian regime is another example of how 
democratic institutions are not incompatible with auth-
oritarian processes. Indeed, most authoritarian regimes 
possess such institutions. Contrary to the claims of classic 
democratic transition theories, such a “democratic open-
ing” may in fact mean authoritarian stabilization (Camau 
2005) rather than democratization. Albrecht points out the 
democracy bias of theories “based on the assumption that 
authoritarian regimes would experience systemic change 
along certain waves of democratization processes” (2009, 
2). On the contrary, democratic institutions are integrated 
into the system. Rather than being the basis for contentious 
politics, authoritarian elections become a way of permit-
ting co-opted figures to appear.
1.1. Building Authoritarian State Legitimacy
In parallel to coercive processes, the Hashemite monarchy 
has historically constructed a legitimacy based on a specific 
Jordanian identity with ties between social elites and politi-
cal power, and weakened challengers by integrating them 
into a national identity framed by the monarchy while di-
viding them along social lines. Jordan is a relatively new 
state (created in 1921) and was not based on any specific 
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national movement, although Arab nationalist anti-
colonialist movements were present. Locally it is often con-
sidered to be purely a creation of the British. However, 
ninety years later, even its most extreme opponents, still ar-
guing about its artificiality, nonetheless position themselves 
within the state framework. Even actors who deny the legit-
imacy of the monarchy and consider it subordinate to 
American foreign policy, permanently refer to its in-
stitutions as their frame of experience. That they do so on a 
daily basis is not only because Jordan is a repressive state 
and that they fear its security apparatus; the State’s in-
stitutions, especially the army and the legal system (Massad 
2001), have indeed played an integrative role. The creation 
– out of nowhere – of a specific Jordanian identity is one of 
the greatest successes of the Hashemite monarchy.
 One element of the strategy deployed by the monarchy 
since the 1950s to build a specific Jordanian identity was to 
gradually transform the post-1948 Palestinian-Jordanians 
and the Palestinian national movement into a foreign fig-
ure, an “Other” (Massad 2001, 274). In the same para-
doxical mode, King Hussein called for unity yet fostered 
divisions between the two groups by specifically recruiting 
Transjordanians to the public sector, which led Palestinians 
to remain mainly in the private sector. Tribes have been 
promoted as the core of the Transjordanian identity. The 
monarchy’s differential treatment of the two populations, 
clearly designated as Palestinian or Transjordanian, has cre-
ated two different communities with different backgrounds 
– which was not necessarily the case at the beginning. 
While these differences are often denied by opposition 
leaders, they are clearly segmented along these lines.
1.2. Tribalization and Depoliticization
The creation of links between the monarchy and the tribal 
networks and the tribalization of political life represented 
another way for the monarchy to find social support in 
King Hussein’s time. This does not mean that tribal net-
works automatically supported the monarchy; in fact they 
had to be won over. In 1992, the king introduced the “one-
person one-vote” electoral law (a one-round uninominal 
system), whose purpose is to favor a vote along tribal 
rather than partisan lines. The move was part of Hussein’s 
strategy of tribalization of society, and has been successful. 
Tribalization was seen as a method of depoliticizing society 
and weakening the opposition. Indeed, whatever their 
political role, tribal networks are not an ideological power. 
The new role they have been given, notably through elec-
toral laws that under-represent urban areas, has further in-
creased the importance of these networks (Chatelard 2004, 
333). Depoliticization has been reinforced by a political 
and economic strategy of “brain export,”1 encouraging in-
tellectuals to emigrate. This is seen as having a double ad-
vantage: exporting skilled manpower provides economic 
benefits, but is also a way to export protest (Cantini 2008; 
De Bel-Air 2003, 21).
1.3. Authoritarian Liberalism
While the opposition remains segmented, the transition 
from King Hussein to King Abdullah II has led to changes 
in the basis of the monarchy’s legitimacy and social sup-
port. Here, authoritarian stability does not exclude real 
evolution in implementation processes. Abdullah II is not 
the expert in tribal networks that Hussein was and has not 
enjoyed the same legitimacy in that field. When he came to 
power in 1999, he was portrayed in numerous political 
jokes and talks as a foreigner speaking better English than 
Arabic. Political criticism was expressed in a more public 
way at that time. Now, some years later, the atmosphere has 
changed, with Abdullah II, like his father, dissolving parlia-
ment and ruling by decree (Bank and Valbjørn 2010, 311). 
He has steered the monarchy towards a kind of auth-
oritarian liberalism with strong priority given to economic 
reforms, in a concomitant process of economic liberaliz-
ation and authoritarian consolidation that is not specific to 
Jordan (Kienle 2008). This also means that the monarchy 
now relies more on businesspeople and experts than on 
tribal networks (even if the two are not mutually exclusive: 
a businessman can be chosen from the same tribe where 
previously a traditional notable would have been favored). 
1 Rather than “brain drain” in this case, because it 
is a deliberate economic and political strategy (Lar-
zillière 2010).
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One of the results of the 2007 elections was that the “old 
guard” lost its seats to an economic – and very wealthy – 
new guard with no political background, which was backed 
by the monarchy. Many electors sold their votes to it, and 
promises were made on the basis of the wealth of the can-
didates. Indeed, the role of parliamentarians is increasingly 
perceived as one of patronage and dispensing services 
(Clark 2010; Lust-Okar 2001), and political position is not 
really at stake. While this capitalist new guard has formed a 
bloc in parliament, “the national brotherhood,” it does not 
appear to have a real ideologically coherent liberal platform 
(Rantawi 2009). Votes for them do not mean that liberal 
economic reforms are well accepted. There have been reac-
tions against privatization policies and the price increases 
implied by the proposed and partially implemented ending 
of state subsidies.
The case of the “new guard” shows how elections in an 
authoritarian system can be mere democratic “window 
dressing” for the regime, where parliament has no real 
political role and the electoral process is massively biased. 
At the same time, the electoral process is used to permit 
new co-opted elites to emerge, as in Morocco (Barwig 
2009) or Egypt (Koehler 2009), and “elections are more 
frequently contests over access to state resources” (Lust-
Okar 2006, 468). The success of such an operation is only 
short term, since the favored figures that emerge in this 
way fail to acquire the legitimacy that the Islamists obtain 
by other means.
In the absence of a real partisan system, the focus of politi-
cization and mobilization has been much more on the cre-
ation and development of alternative arenas than on 
participation in these “democratic” institutions. This has 
taken two main forms in Jordan. On one hand, pro-
fessional associations have taken advantage of their expert-
ise, which is needed by the monarchy, to express some 
limited opposition. On the other hand, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has created a grassroots social network based 
on charitable associations. The definition of these different 
arenas is also linked to the theoretical evolution in the 
analysis of authoritarian regimes, which “insists on jux-
taposing different political arenas with different logics, 
rather than analyzing them as a homogeneous entity” 
(translated from Dabène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 21). 
If a limited political pluralism characterizes authoritarian 
regimes, and does not exclude extensive social pluralism in 
the same regimes (Linz 1975), it is a “pluralism by default” 
which emerges from the limitation of authoritarian pro-
cesses and not from a political project (translated from 
Camau 2005, 21). Alternative arenas are part of this plural-
ism; however, the analysis also shows the limits of their 
political role and, in that sense, their status is ambivalent. 
2. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 1: Professional Associations
When political parties are forbidden or tightly controlled, 
professional organizations are one of the rare places, along 
with universities, where collective action and mobilization 
are possible. Their professional role guarantees them in-
stitutional existence, even in authoritarian regimes. That is 
why their possible politicization is an issue, and why such 
associations face important state pressures, in particular 
during their internal elections. In the Arab world, their po-
sitioning vis-à-vis the political power takes two forms. One 
is “corporatism,” where the state instrumentalizes pro-
fessional associations for power implementation (Ayubi 
1995; Bianchi 1989; Schmitter 1974). In the second case, as-
sociations use their professional activity and economic 
utility to gain leeway and become a place of opposition, an 
alternative to political parties.
In Jordan both cases exist. The former concern workers’ 
unions (niqâbât al ‘ummâl), in which membership is not 
compulsory; the latter corporative “professional unions” 
(niqâbât mihaniyya), here referred to as associations 
(where membership is compulsory in order to work in the 
field concerned).2 The latter have three functions: provid-
ing services for their members, defining the profession, and 
political activity. They emerged from groups of pro-
fessionals who wanted to organize themselves, often arising 
2 Although currently members who do not pay 
their subscriptions are rarely excluded from the pro-
fession.
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through the legal transformation of informal associations 
into official professional associations.
The situation of the workers’ unions is totally different. In 
1953, workers obtained the right to form trade unions, but 
these were created top-down by government order, which 
could easily be revoked (Hamayil 2000, 74). The regime 
was highly suspicious of this working class trade-unionism, 
which was strongly influenced by left-wing political cur-
rents, in contrast to the professional associations that were 
perceived as a potentially supportive elite. The trade unions 
were involved in political mobilization and protest for a 
time, but since the 1990s their leaders have been co-opted 
by and financially dependent on the regime. Following a 
common model in the Arab world, they contribute more 
than the professional associations to a “state-centered cor-
poratism” (translated from Gobe 2008, 269). Longuenesse 
explains this difference by the absence in the trade unions 
of a strong socio-professional identity, while there has been 
on the contrary a drive for mobilization and unification in 
the professional associations (2007, 109).
2.1. Politics and Expertise
The twelve professional associations which exist today in 
Jordan had about 130,000 members in 2011.3 The pro-
fessional and political aspects have both been present since 
their creation, mainly from the 1950s to the 1970s. Their in-
itial purpose was to regulate the profession by limiting access 
to those who had certain qualifications. In addition, pro-
fessional schemes (training for example) and social services 
(pension fund, social security, and so on) were soon pro-
vided. These professional associations are financed by mem-
bership fees, returns on investments, donations and, in some 
cases, subsidies from the Jordanian state. The associations’ 
professional role has given them financial capabilities and a 
specific legitimacy based on knowledge. Composed of law-
yers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals, they already 
represented elite groups whose opinions could not easily be 
ignored and who are indispensable for the implementation 
of modernization policies in the country. Politically, the six 
professional associations housed in the historical main 
headquarters building are the most important: doctors, en-
gineers, pharmacists, agronomists, lawyers, and dentists. 
With 70,000 members4, the engineers have the largest pro-
fessional association, which is fully financially independent 
with substantial resources (Lo nguenesse 2007, 137). Ali H., 
engineer, explains the power relation:
The organization of work is a role where the state cannot replace 
us, that is what gives us our power, and if we withdraw, the coun-
try would be totally disorganized. For example, as engineers, we 
control the plans for each building project … The government 
does not have the capacity to do that.5
Beyond their professional expertise, the professional as-
sociations enjoy another source of public legitimacy: they 
are the only institutions with truly democratic electoral 
procedures. The role of the professional associations was 
not diminished by the establishment of political parties in 
1992, which are legally restricted and remain weak. Indeed, 
the leaders of the professional associations are better 
known than most parliamentarians, with the exception of 
those from the Islamist movement. Their political evol-
ution echoes that of the political movements: mainly con-
trolled by leftists and the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Al-Khazendar 1997, 112), the Islamists now have the ma-
jority, especially in the governing councils of the pro-
fessional associations. Indeed, the Islamists have held the 
presidency of the engineering association since 1988, and 
later acquired the majority on its council.
Islamist political predominance is clear, but should not be 
overestimated. The direct election of presidents favors well-
known figures regardless of their political affiliation, which 
can differ from the majority of the association’s council. 
3 Common council of the professional associ-
ations, January 2011. The newly formed teachers’ as-
sociation will add 105,000 members: Jordan Times, 
March 30, 2012.
4 Source: Engineering Association, October 2009.
5 Translated interviews, Amman, November 2007 
and November 2009. This independent leftist activ-
ist is a civil engineering consultant and speaker for 
the professional associations. Aude Signoles de-
scribes a similar process (2003), showing how Pales-
tinian engineers have become central political actors 
by obtaining responsibility for the technical verifi-
cation of all building permits.
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There are well-known leftist and nationalist figures, and 
the Islamists lost the presidency of the medical association 
to an Arab nationalist in 2009. Moreover, the Islamist cam-
paigns focus on reprofessionalizing the professional as-
sociations, which limits their political relevance. A decrease 
in election participation and payment of dues can be ob-
served, in parallel to increasing unemployment. This de-
crease also means that the base on which Islamists are 
elected is not as broad as it seems (Clark 2010).
2.2. A Limited Space
Whatever their main political affiliation, their great legit-
imacy and social utility has allowed professional as-
sociations to institutionalize a power relationship with the 
monarchy and they have never been banned, even if leaders 
have sometimes been imprisoned. That is why they can be 
described as an “oasis of opposition in a desert of auth-
oritarianism” (Harmsen 2008, 121). The main theme of 
political mobilization is support of the Palestinian cause, 
which is the objective of several committees that cut across 
professionals associations: the Palestine committee, the 
prisoners committee and antinormalization (of the rela-
tionship with Israel) committee. However, professional as-
sociations have also taken a stand on internal issues 
including democratization, martial law, and freedom of ex-
pression. There is a broad consensus on political positions 
that strongly support for the Palestinian cause and Palesti-
nians in the West Bank and Gaza (but not for Palestinians 
in Jordan). This cause is less problematic for the Jordanian 
regime than internal freedoms, as long as Jordan’s foreign 
policy towards Israel is not targeted. Consequently, it is the 
particularly active and well-known antinormalization com-
mittee that has faced particular repression and been de-
clared illegal several times, with its members experiencing 
imprisonment or intimidation.
Professional associations in Jordan constitute an alternative 
mobilization space that is used by many activists as the only 
available political arena. This is particularly true for long-
term activists, whatever their generation.6 After universities, 
the professional associations are the institutions that are 
most strategically important for pursing mobilization. 
Many political struggles in Jordan take the form of a fight 
for the creation of new professional associations.7 Even in 
the trade unions there is now a reform current seeking to 
give workers’ unions some degree of independence.
Nevertheless, the scope of independence is still very li-
mited, both in action and mobilization capacity. The mon-
archy has often modified or threatened to modify laws 
defining the professional associations’ status – especially 
their election arrangements – in order to control them 
more effectively. Each time the reactions of the professional 
associations, which also used their links with the elite of 
the regime, allowed them to maintain their status. In such 
periods, the professional associations sustain their capacity 
for action by insisting on their professional role. This re-
strictive situation is created by a combination of direct in-
junctions issued by the monarchy and self-censorship by 
the professional associations, which do not want to involve 
themselves in direct confrontation. It is comparable with 
the Moroccan case, where institutionalization of the op-
position has also led to the emergence of limits and forms 
of closure (Vairel 2008, 231). As in Morocco, these forms of 
closure are spatially visible, as the professional associations’ 
main form of action is meetings in or near their head-
quarters rather than demonstrations circulating in the city. 
Therefore, although the exact terms of the power relation-
ship change a little according to the political situation, it 
remains constrained within a very narrow space.
In addition to coercive processes, a second kind of limitation 
of the themes and form of mobilizations stems from the 
class heterogeneity of the professional associations. For 
example, the head of a professional association may be re-
spected as a political opposition figure but at the same time 
6 Sixty-two careers of long-term activists from the 
different political currents in Jordan were docu-
mented through qualitative interviews held between 
2006 and 2010 (Larzillière 2012a). Leftist and 
nationalist leaders were mainly born between 1946 
and 1955 while Islamist leaders were mainly born 
between 1956 and 1965 Here the prosopography just 
confirms the other data about the evolution of these 
movements.
7 One good example is the long struggle for the 
creation of a teachers’ association. First requested by 
activists in 1975, it was repeatedly refused and the 
demand was put forward again by teachers who or-
ganised demonstrations and sit-ins. In the context of 
the Arab mobilization of 2011, the creation of this 
association has been authorised but with specifi-
cations forbidding any political activities.
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have a negative reputation as a manager because of the pay 
and working conditions at his firm. This will limit his capac-
ity for political mobilization while his position at the head 
of the association impedes social conflicts over working con-
ditions. Heterogeneity also plays a role in relations with the 
state, where professionals have different interests depending 
on their position in the rent economy and the “neop-
atrimonial redistribution circles” (translated from Dieterich 
1999, 316) and are therefore more or less inclined to criticize 
the economic system. Moreover, if these professional as-
sociations become not just one place of political opposition 
but the place of political opposition, the social basis for 
political commitment is restricted. Members must have a 
degree, even if there has been some social evolution from 
the nationalist and leftist period, when leaders were drawn 
mainly from the traditional elite and notables,8 to the Islam-
ist time, where leaders come more from the middle class.
Inside the professional organizations there are debates 
about the objectives of political commitment. This relates 
not only to their positioning in a repressive national con-
text, but also concerns a general evolution of political ac-
tivism towards greater use of political expertise. In the 
professional associations, this trend results from a set of 
three ongoing forces. First, the direct influence of inter-
national donors and the theme of “good governance,” 
which emphasizes normative administrative practices and 
downplays ideological discourse on values. Second, the 
Jordanian regime itself has tended to apply the economic 
norms of international organizations, since Abdullah II 
subscribed to a liberal economic agenda. And finally, op-
positional activism orients itself increasingly towards ad-
vising or reforming the state’s actions. A whole NGO sector 
has emerged and professional associations are also well 
positioned as their status places a premium on knowledge 
and competence. Here they find economic niches by ensur-
ing a high level of competence for their members and con-
tribute to Jordan’s national economic plan. This relatively 
new general trend in political practice is not limited to “pe-
ripheral” and non-hegemonic countries,9 although it is 
more visible there. One of the consequences is a reduction 
of the radical contestation posture, which does not satisfy 
all opponents and leaves important issues to one side. Con-
sequently, revolts may appear in other places, beyond the 
control of the acknowledged and tolerated opposition (Da-
bène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 24).
Another kind of space has also emerged as an alternative 
arena of politicization: the grassroots social movement of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The same ambivalent tension 
between contestation and integration can be observed 
here, with the same ambivalent consequences for ac-
tivism. As mentioned above, the mainstream Islamists 
have lately been very present in professional associations 
and some Islamists are leaders in both arenas. But the dis-
tinction between the two arenas highlights the specific 
legitimacy and repertory of action of the social movement 
and charity network, which differs from the professional 
association scene.
3. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 2: The Islamist Social Movement
The Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood has 
become an alternative arena of mobilization not through 
its economic role, but by becoming the main social force – 
mainly through a charitable network that represents a real 
alternative to failing state institutions. It was long consider-
ed an ally by the monarchy and therefore less vigorously re-
pressed than leftists and nationalists (Budeiri 1997, 199). 
The Muslim Brotherhood has never really been anti-mon-
archy, which has allowed them to occupy the social field as 
they were not really seeking political power. In spite of its 
opposition role, the Muslim Brotherhood has frequently 
had the same enemies as the monarchy, which has created a 
bond between them. Thus, this mainstream Islamist move-
ment has slowly gained a kind of social hegemony (in the 
sense that they have no real challengers) while other move-
ments (leftist and nationalist) have lost ideological sig-
nificance along with their political place.
8 Although in the 1980s, the possibility of schol-
arship in the USSR somewhat changed the leftist so-
cial profile.
9 Non-hegemonic or “peripheral” countries oc-
cupy a subordinate position in international power 
relations and lack the means to influence inter-
national agendas. They may, however, have some au-
tonomy to format their national agenda and choose 
their cooperation partners. See Losego and Arvanitis 
(2009).
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3.1. Social Hegemony?
Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been present in 
Jordan since independence in 1946, the movement only 
started to gather real support in society during the first 
intifada (1987–1993), when it organized a campaign 
under the slogan “Islam is the solution” (to which it still 
adheres). So its leaders positioned it as a very important 
social provider and the champion of the Palestinian cause 
(which it redefined with a religious vocabulary). These 
have been the two main pillars of the Muslim Brother-
hood’s development in Jordan, two justifications that 
have had the advantage of not setting up the movement 
as a challenger to the monarchy, unlike the leftists and 
nationalists. Indeed, Islamist support for the Palestinian 
cause has largely taken the form of humanitarian aid for 
the West Bank and Gaza, and relates more to an incanta-
tory nationalism as it never truly opposes the king’s peace 
policy with Israel. In this sense, the Islamists have been a 
deradicalizing factor, offering a vehicle for support of the 
Palestinian cause and a repertory of actions based mainly 
on collecting aid and organizing memorial meetings. In 
this way, the Muslim Brotherhood has consolidated its 
position without challenging the monarchy. Nonetheless, 
once legitimized, it went a step further, adding domestic 
demands concerning political freedom, social justice, and 
anti-corruption. These issues have also won them con-
siderable public support.
Beyond their important role as a provider of services and 
aid, the Muslim Brotherhood is especially visible as an 
ideological power, in the sense that it has had a major 
impact on the paradigms through which the society 
understands itself and projects itself into the future. 
Many of the references they use have their source in 
other political trends; however, the Muslim Brothers have 
been able to recompose religious, nationalist, and even 
leftist references in a kind of syncretism in which they 
are now unchallenged. Their reformulation of Palesti-
nian nationalism has already been mentioned; the same 
can be said about Arab nationalism. They have also inte-
grated the social justice of the leftists. Above all, in a field 
where the religious reference has become the main 
source of legitimacy, their struggle to secure the mon-
opoly on interpretation of Islam has been especially ef-
fective. This does not mean that they have no challengers 
at that level, but even their challengers tend to argue 
within a religious paradigm heavily influenced by the Is-
lamist movement.
This is facilitated by the lack of real conflict about the lib-
eral economic perspective, which is now essential to the 
monarchy and its foreign donors. Although the Muslim 
Brothers conflate liberal economic policy with the ques-
tion of social justice and poverty, they fundamentally 
agree with the liberal perspective on the economy. The 
only real point of opposition is dependency on foreign do-
nors, which they want to reduce while the regime often 
sees foreign aid as a solution. Their syncretic capacity be-
came visible again in the 2011 mobilization where the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (as in Egypt: Ben Néfissa 
2011) quickly integrated some of the main demands raised 
by other actors.
However, their quite hegemonic position, especially in the 
most populous, predominantly Palestinian urban areas, 
reflects more lack of rivals than any massive support. With 
regard to both charity work and ideological impact, they 
have no real challenger. While leftists have massively con-
verted themselves into NGOs and human rights as-
sociations (Larzillière 2012b), these rather elitist 
structures have never given them the legitimacy of the Is-
lamic charity network. To acquire funding, they have to 
advance the priorities of international organizations, 
often creating a rift with the expectations of the popu-
lation, which prefers the more “ad hoc” and personalized 
Islamic aid. These difficulties were highlighted when a co-
alition including the left was set up in Jordan in 2002 
under the banner of anti-imperialism, but the dominant 
position of the Islamists allowed them to impose their 
themes. It therefore seems to many left wing activists that 
the step of forming a coalition was a strategic error, be-
cause they have been unable to oppose the Islamist ar-
gumentation. As one observed:
It is very difficult to convince people with our left discourse be-
cause you always have to face the fact that it comes from Western 
countries and then explain that not everything that comes from 
the West is bad. The Islamist argumentation is very simple: 
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When we were good Muslims we created empires, since we have 
abandoned Islam we have been divided.10
The recently created leftist social forums allow new kinds 
of mobilization for short-term projects, where activists 
seek agreement on a mode of action and demand rather 
than on general ideology.11 Their flexible membership 
offers an alternative to the tight controls of the associations 
by the regime. However it has not been sufficient to give 
them a broad social base.
The specific social and ideological capacity of the Islamists 
in Jordan must be clearly distinguished from their access to 
political power. Here we can distinguish a social hegemony, 
in the sense of social leadership, ideas, and ideologies 
which do not flow down from the regime. The monarchy 
has never been the source of the predominant ideology. 
Gramsci’s categories allow us to distinguish the apparatus 
for direct domination, which belongs to the monarchy, 
from social and cultural hegemony (1978, 314). However, 
hegemony is generally understood as a creation of those in 
power, albeit an indirect one. Theories of ideology are 
mainly theories of distortion, whose purpose is to legitim-
ize the power system (Ricoeur 1997, 17). Therefore, on a 
more theoretical level, this case leads us to reconceptualize 
categories such as hegemony and ideology in a manner that 
is less centered on the state. As Hall’s media analysis shows, 
ideologies do not mechanically produce consent for the 
state and there is competition and struggle at that level 
(1982). The Jordanian case seems to lead us one step 
further in that direction, showing how cultural hegemony 
can appear outside the state.
3.2. Integrated Opposition
The articulation between the social and cultural import-
ance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the political appar-
atus is indeed highly problematic. The Muslim 
Brotherhood could be considered a social movement under 
Touraine’s definition, which combines social force and the 
defining of the historicity of the society,12 were it not for 
the real difficulty of transforming it into an efficient politi-
cal opposition. This also specifically illustrates the ambiva-
lence of such alternative arenas of mobilization under 
authoritarian regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood does not 
confront the monarchy but has managed to create real 
spaces of influence, which in a way “short-circuits” politi-
cal power, while channeling and deradicalizing opposition. 
The Muslim Brotherhood never reacted in a militant 
manner to repression. On the contrary, it even had a cal-
ming influence during riots provoked by the rising cost of 
living (1989), or during student revolts at Yarmouk Univer-
sity in 1984 and 1986.13 This policy did, however, lead to a 
rift between local Muslim Brotherhood leadership at the 
university, who co-organized the demonstration with leftist 
elements, and the head of the movement, who wanted to 
avoid confrontation with the State.14 The Muslim Brother-
hood participated in the parliamentary elections of 1993, 
while officially boycotting those of 1997, which were char-
acterized by massive abstentions.15
Here the Muslim Brotherhood maintains its delicate posi-
tion of conflicting participation, as much through self-
censorship as direct repression (Öngün 2008). They receive 
the greater part of their legitimacy through an aura of pu-
rity and integrity that is contingent on their distance from 
political power. They want to maintain this critical position 
while at the same time entering the political game enough 
to influence it. A position that is all the more delicate be-
cause: “since the critical decline of the left, the Islamist 
movement has become the main target of the government 
strategies of co-optation and exclusion” (translated from 
Krämer 1994, 278). The Muslim Brotherhood is held up as 
proof that there is indeed a real democratic process, since 
there is opposition. They have lost part of their radicalism 
and can be defined as an integrated opposition (Albrecht 
2006; Bozarslan 2011), which rather consolidates the posi-
tion of the monarchy.
10 Interview, Amman, December 2005.
11 Interviews with members of the social forum, 
Amman, November 2009.
12 Touraine defines “historicity” as the cultural 
field where conflicts on normative orientations op-
erate. According to his theory, this field and the 
struggle over symbolic representations is essential to 
social movement (Touraine 1978, 87–88).
13 Following Sami Al-Khazendar (1997, 142–45).
14 Interview with one of the leaders of the student 
revolt, Amman, March 2007.
15 It is not certain, however, that the abstentions 
were a consequence of the boycott. It is also possible 
that the Islamists anticipated the development and 
boycotted the election for that reason (Augé 1998, 
246).
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The events of the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2010 
were particularly indicative of the limits of this “conflicting 
participation” policy on the part of the Muslim Brother-
hood. Since 2005, the Islamists have been confronted with 
an intensification of government intervention, which has 
introduced new laws forbidding speeches in mosques, 
tightening control on the media and charities, and limiting 
the activities of professional associations (ICG 2005, 15). 
Confronted with this situation, two competing trends arose 
inside the Islamic Action Front.16 The “doves” supported a 
cooperative attitude under the motto “participating not 
overpowering”; “the hawks” favored more confrontational 
methods, with some calling for a boycott of the elections. 
During the selection process, activists favored candidates 
from the hawks. The party leadership, however, decided 
not to take this path and instead appointed dove candi-
dates. The Islamists candidates were accused of cooper-
ation with the government while being repressed by it 
nonetheless, and became the real losers of the elections. 
The results have strongly destabilised the doves inside the 
party and their strategy was partly delegitimized. This was 
confirmed two years later when new parliamentary elec-
tions took place in November 2010. This time the Islamists 
boycotted the elections, challenging the electoral law that 
favors tribal votes and rural areas. The changes in their 
position toward official democratic institutions, sometimes 
boycotting and sometimes participating, illustrates the di-
lemma for the opposition when a system is well controlled 
but not totally blocked. The opposition considered par-
ticipating in well-controlled institutions a “no-win” situ-
ation which would have negative consequences on their 
own legitimacy and social support. The risk in that context 
is becoming too integrated to be considered as opposition, 
and thus losing legitimacy in the eyes of some activists.
3.3. Delegitimization and Radicalization
These political developments have consequences in terms 
of the public perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its popular support, especially by youth (ICG 2005). Their 
legitimacy has gradually decreased because they seem in-
creasingly associated with the Jordanian regime and its pol-
icies. This marginalization stems not from the success of 
other political trends but rather from dissatisfaction with 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus creates a real political 
vacuum (Hroub 2007, 3). Finally, indiscriminate repression 
against Muslim Brothers during certain periods, regardless 
whether they preach cooperation or radical opposition, has 
also contributed to the delegitimization of the cooperation 
option and to the radicalization of Islamist groups.
Thus, the policy of destabilization of the mainstream Is-
lamists undermines the moderates and leads to a radical-
ization of the movement or support for other more radical 
Islamist movements. Some of their sympathizers have 
turned towards what they consider a more radical and less 
integrated opposition, the Salafist movement. Salafists are 
divided mainly between reformist and jihadist Salafists 
over the question of political violence. Heated arguments 
occurred between strategically opposed reformists and ji-
hadists and only the latter can be considered a real opposi-
tion (Caillet 2011). The jihadists are distinguished by their 
refusal to cooperate in any way with the regime and by 
their informal network structure, maintained to avoid re-
pression. They do not hesitate to launch fierce verbal at-
tacks against the Muslim Brotherhood (Caillet 2011). They 
appear to have recruited among the poorer classes most af-
fected by the economic crisis. The number of activists is 
said to be very limited, but they claim nearly as many sym-
pathizers as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2000, 
223–24). In the context of the 2011 mobilization, Salafists 
organized meetings and demonstrations, some of which 
ended in violent confrontations with the police and led to 
mass arrests.
Another sign of the weakening of the mainstream Islamists 
and the way this can lead to specific forms of radicalization 
is seen in the recent proliferation of tribal clashes, es-
pecially involving youth (Masri 2009). This non-political 
violence is clearly linked to depoliticization and tribal-
ization as elements of repressive politics. Up to now, the 
16 The Islamic Action Front is the political party 
created by the Muslim Brotherhood when political 
parties were authorized in 1992.
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state’s tolerance for tribal violence and crime has been 
much higher than for political violence. Lucrative tribal-
based trafficking (in stolen cars for example) continues.17 
Clashes between tribal groups have been allowed to occur 
in universities whereas the smallest political demonstration 
was harshly repressed (Cantini 2008). As a consequence, 
the effect of depoliticization seems particularly strong 
among youth and is particularly visible in the universities, 
which were previously an important place of political ac-
tivity. Even the leaders of the student movement 
 thabahtoona, whose political activities could have been 
seen as a counter-example, mention their difficulty in 
mobilizing and how tribal identities now seem more im-
portant to the students.18
Violence resulting from active tribalization processes to 
marginalize ideological opposition is not specific to Jor-
dan. The regime’s policy designed to weaken political op-
position has in fact engendered violent effects that were 
initially considered to be unimportant for a well-con-
trolled state with extensive security services, but have gone 
further than expected. The proliferation of tribal clashes 
worries tribal leaders and fosters criticism about political 
use of tribes and interference in choice of tribal leaders.19 
There is here a dual process at work: first an increase in in-
tertribal violence and then an increase in the tribes’ con-
frontational stance vis-à-vis the monarchy. As long as 
tribes could be used as a largely unified network and iden-
tity, this strategy was indeed effective in strengthening the 
monarchy and weakening the political opposition. How-
ever, this policy has also intensified identity segmentation 
inside tribal networks. Paradoxically, the process has gener-
ated non-political violence with very political con-
sequences, jeopardizing the monarchy’s security order and 
tribal support. In the arenas of the professional as-
sociations and the Muslim Brotherhood, the process 
underlines the shifting frontiers of politicization and 
mobilization and the changing status of actors, even under 
conditions of authoritarian stability.
Reaction in Jordan to the events in Tunisia since January 
2011 also shows how regional mobilization can impact 
political commitment, even in the absence of direct 
changes in the national political configuration. This has re-
inforced the opposition capacity of both the professional 
associations and the social movement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They were not the initiators of the first dem-
onstrations in support of the revolt in Tunisia (unlike the 
important demonstrations in 2009 against the Israeli attack 
in Gaza where Islamists and professional associations were 
involved at the very beginning). It was the leftists, margi-
nalized but taking a more confrontational stance, who 
started this new movement, together with some long rarely 
seen actors: youth and Palestinians from the camps. How-
ever, Islamists and professional associations soon caught up 
with the movement, bringing in a much greater capacity of 
mobilization than the first actors. They have supported so-
cial demands like price controls and pay rises (there is no 
minimum wage in Jordan and one-third of the population 
is categorized as poor by international agencies).
At first, political demands concentrated on the usual and 
authorized criticisms against the parliament and the gov-
ernment: inefficiency and corruption. The monarchy made 
concessions. King Abdullah II changed the cabinet and of-
ficially asked the government to implement a more active 
social policy. Immediate salary and pension increases were 
announced. However, on the initiative of the Islamists, the 
movement has gone one step further, demanding that the 
prime minister be elected and no longer chosen by the 
king. In taking this step, the Islamist movement is going 
beyond its previous position of integrated opposition be-
cause this policy is a real challenge to the monarchy. It rep-
resents a radicalization of the opposition’s demands but 
not of its repertory of action. The Muslim Brotherhood 
had more and more trouble with its position of “integrated 
opposition,” which makes generational renewal difficult 
and leads some activists to radicalize or leave. Thus, they 
have slowly changed their strategy and are now using the 
17 Interview with Geraldine Chatelard, Amman, 
October 2009.
18 Launched in April 2007, this is a movement for 
the defense of student rights and the creation of a 
students’ union. Interview with one of the move-
ment’s leaders, Amman, November 2009. See also 
Adely 2010.
19 Interview with a professor and political colum-
nist, independent Islamist, Amman, November 2009.
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new impetus given by a regional mobilization to adopt a 
more confrontational stance.
Above all, the reaction of the Jordanian opposition shows 
the impact of international and regional processes on 
national political commitment and the complex ar-
ticulation of these three levels (international, regional, 
national) should be further explored (Bank and Valbjørn 
2010). Globalization has an impact on political commit-
ment, and some trends in Jordan are clearly related to more 
global trends like the evolution of activists towards expert-
ise (Larzillière 2012b; Signoles 2006; Wagner 2004). Their 
ideological references are mainly regional. Even when they 
refer to global theories, their understanding of them is 
clearly embedded in the regional history. As the 2011–2012 
mobilization has shown, even if the national power rela-
tionship does not seem to change, regional events appear to 
impact activism more through identification than direct 
relationships. While the power relationship has not been 
directly impacted, the regional mobilization has, however, 
generated a “shared sense of uncertainty” among chal-
lengers and incumbents. The process confirms how such 
changes in perception are crucial to the occurrence of con-
tentious episodes (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 9). 
4. Conclusion
Politicization is a specific and sensitive issue in auth-
oritarian regimes, as it concerns the very possibility of a 
political arena appearing in front of a regime that seeks to 
erase any challenge. This approach is more classical than 
the recent focus in more democratic contexts on politiciz-
ation as the inclusion in institutional policies of new issues 
(Arnaud 2005, 15; Lagroye 2004, 360; Ion 2005). The Jord-
anian case shows the possibility of dissociation between 
democratic institutions and political arenas. This does not 
mean that democratic institutions have no role at all, but 
rather that they serve as an intermediary for the regime in 
the process of forging integrated elites and patronage 
structures. Other contentious arenas appear too, where well 
positioned and resourceful organizations can be partially 
transformed into a basis for protest with challenging 
frames of reference. Apart from repression, their own re-
sources, economic and social roles, and their integration in 
the regime frame and limit the kind of political commit-
ment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between chall-
enging and integrated positions. Professional associations 
hesitate to jeopardize their elite role while the Muslim 
Brotherhood may be content with its social hegemony. 
Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas, their 
connections and relational characteristics. When one arena 
is too controlled, political forces invent new ones, while 
there is a perpetual back and forth between contentious 
arena and regime. Under authoritarian regimes, radical-
ization processes, both in repertory of action and ideology, 
appear at the turn, when alternative arenas become so inte-
grated in the regime that they lose their contentious role. 
These political arenas are the places where alternative 
worldviews and ideologies are produced and shared. At 
that level, the Muslim Brotherhood has a very specific posi-
tion as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegem-
onic power and position. The case thus undermines the 
analysis of ideologies as mere reflection of positions in 
power relationship and supports an analytical separation 
between political power and ideology.
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